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Non-Profit Hospital Tax Exemptions: Where Did
They Come From and Where Are They Going?
For decades property taxes have generated the most substantial
portion of revenues for local governments.1 Yet, despite the huge
percentage of general revenue such taxes produce, many entities
have historically been afforded beneficial tax treatment in the form
of exemptions.2 Such preferential treatment was most commonly
bestowed upon charitable organizations such as hospitals and may
be traced back as far as seventeenth century England and the Stat-
ute of Charitable Uses.3 Such exemptions, invariably granted by
the legislatures, create a trust between the healthcare organization
and the public.4
In Pennsylvania, the legislature has granted such exemptions
under the provisions of Article VIII of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.5 The specific exemption for hospitals is set forth in Title 72 of
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated Sections 5020-
204.6
1. Utah County, Etc. v Intermountain Health- Care, 709 P2d 265, 268 (Utah 1985),
citing the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental relations, n 5, The Property Tax in a
Changing Environment 99 (1974). The court estimated that from 1970 to 1971 property
taxes accounted for 64% of local government revenue. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P2d
at 268. A more recent estimate of 80% was suggested by Allegheny County Solicitor Ira
Weis in a lecture at Duquesne University Law School in April of 1992.
2. Comment, Nonprofit Hospitals and the State Tax Exemption: An Analysis of
the Issues Since Utah County v Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 9 Va Tax Rev 599, 600
(1990).
3. Comment, 9 Va Tax Rev at 600.
4. Id at 601, n 14 citing William F. Frateher, IVA, Scott on Trusts §348 et seq
(Little, Brown and Co., Supp 1992).
5. Pa Const, Art VIII § 2(a) states:
The General Assembly may by law exempt from taxation: (v) Institutions of purely
public charity, but in the case of any real property tax exemptions only that portion
of real property of such institutions which is actually and regularly used for the pur-
poses of the institution.
Pa Const, Art VIII § 2(a).
6. Assessors Certification Act, 72 Pa Stat Ann § 5020-204 (Purdon 1992). The rele-
vant text of this statute provides:
(a) The following property shall be exempt from all county, city, borough, town,
township, road, poor and school tax to wit:
(3) All hospitals, universities, colleges, seminaries, academies, associations and
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The charitable nature of hospitals in early America gave rise to
the foundation for tax exemptions. In the nineteenth century,
American hospitals typically provided shelter and treatment for
the poor who were legitimate objects of charity.7 Indeed, during
this era hospitals provided more of a welfare than a medical bene-
fit to the poor." Patients were housed in large wards, often fended
for themselves and frequently did not recover from their medical
conditions.' For these reasons, wealthy patients as well as physi-
cians avoided hospitals.' °
As advancements in aseptic technique and anesthesia evolved,
there was a proliferation in the surgical treatment of disease." Al-
though the non-profit hospitals were able to physically accommo-
date the needs of such advancements, their previous sources of rev-
enue such as endowments, donations and the support of religious
entities proved inadequate.12 In order to meet this new financial
burden of increasing medical costs, hospitals began to charge pa-
tients for their care and limit such care to more acute illnesses.' s
With the explosion of medical advancements of twentieth cen-
tury America, hospitals had to face a never-ending challenge to
keep pace with skyrocketing medical costs. With the ever-increas-
ing demand for the highest quality of care by the public, a highly
competitive healthcare market evolved. The dilemma was further
compounded by constraints on hospital reimbursement by third
party payers such as Medicare and Medicaid programs which were
implemented in the 1950's and 1960's to promote technological
growth. 4
institutions of learning,. benevolence, or charity, including fire and rescue sta-
tions, with the grounds thereto annexed and necessary for the occupancy and
enjoyment of the same, founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private
charity: Provided, [tihat the entire revenue derived by the same be applied to
the support and to increase the efficiency and facilities thereof, the repair and
the necessary increase of grounds and buildings thereof, and for no other pur-
pose; . ..
72 Pa Stat Ann § 5020-204 (Purdon 1989).
7. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 145-70 (1982).






14. Melvin Horowitz, Corporate Reorganization: The Last Gasp or Last Clear
Chance for the Tax Exempt, Nonprofit Hospital?, 13 American Journal of Law and
Medicine 527, 527-59 (1988). Although payment by third parties were guaranteed, the col-
lectible fees were essentially dictated by the payor rather than the hospital. Horowitz, 13
Vol. 31:343
Conments
One method used by non-profit healthcare organizations to keep
pace with these costs was corporate reorganization. Specifically,
the polycorporate enterprise model was adopted whereby hospitals
primarily controlled by administrators created chain enterprises
consisting of non-profit and for-profit entities.1" This hybrid allows
the non-profit hospitals to generate revenues from its for-profit en-
tities and utilize such revenue to offset operating costs of the
healthcare facility under the charitable exemption advantage.1"
However, with the socio-economic crises of today leading to in-
creasing concerns for availability of healthcare to indigents as well
as to the middle class, coupled with a decreasing tax base, the ex-
empt status of these institutions has come under intense fire since
the early to mid 1980's. Many of the Pennsylvania cases turned on
whether the defendant institution constituted a "purely public
charity."' 7 Pennsylvania courts were therefore compelled to draw
upon the definition of purely public charity rooted in Episcopal
Academy v Philadelphia,8 decided in 1892.
The court in Episcopal Academy held that a purely public char-
ity relieved the public of its burdens, advanced the public good
and had as its beneficiary the public with no private or pecuniary
return to the giver or any particular person.' 9 However, the court
further held that such an entity should not lose its tax exempt sta-
tus simply because it received revenue from the beneficiaries of its
services as long as such revenues were limited to those necessary to
continue operation.20 Furthermore, the court stated that if at any
time the operation of such a facility took on the appearance of a
business for profit, the charity would incur tax liabilities as would
any other business.2' The court thus concluded that the word
"purely" was analogous to the word "wholly. '1 2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further clarified the meaning
of a purely public charity in 1936 when it stated in YMCA Associ-
ation of Germantown v Philadelphia that such an institution:
must possess an eleemosynary characteristic not possessed by institutions or
property devoted to private gain or profit. What is "given" must be more
American Journal of Law and Medicine at 527-59.
15: Id.
16. Id.
17. Pa Const, Art VIII § 2(a)(v).
18. 150 Pa 565, 25 A 55 (1892)..






nearly gratuitous than for a price which impresses one as being proportion-
ate to the services rendered.
23
The YMCA court further rationalized the tax exemption of such
charitable entities by stating:
[a]ny institution which by its charitable activities relieves the government
of part of this burden is conferring a pecuniary benefit upon the body poli-
tic, and in receiving exemption from taxation it is merely being given a
"quid pro quo" for its services in providing something which otherwise the
government would have to provide.
24
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Ogontz School v the Town-
ship of Abington and the School District of Abington Township"6
sought to apply the theories developed in YMCA to determine
whether the Ogontz School was exempt from property tax.2"
Ogontz School, which was formerly operated by a for-profit busi-
ness corporation, had been transferred to a non-profit corporation
and granted charitable tax exemption by the lower courts under
Pennsylvania constitutional and statutory law.2" Using the basic
analytical foundations of YMCA, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts and revoked Ogontz's tax exempt sta-
tus.28 In so holding, the court focused primarily on three areas.
First, the court rejected the notion that Ogontz relieved the gov-
ernment of any of its educational burdens.29 In doing so, the court
noted that although 10% of the students received scholarships, the
revenue generated by the tuition paid by the other 90% more than
offset the scholarship grants.30 Second, the court addressed the fact
that the corporation was not founded wholly by public or private
charity and that the purpose of the corporation was to take over
the assets of the previous business corporation." Third, the court
rejected the assertion that the requisite eleemosynary characteris-
23. YMCA Association of Germantown v Philadelphia, 323 Pa 401, 187 A 204, 208
(1936). The definition of eleemosynary is of or relating to alms or the giving of alms. Con-
tributed as an act of charity: Gratuitous. Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary
423 (Houghton Miflin Company 1984).
24. YMCA, 187 A at 210. For an excellent review of the case law history of Pennsyl-
vania in this area see Comment, Nonprofit Hospitals: Should They Continue To Receive A
Charitable Organization Tax Exemption Under Pennsylvania Law? 28 Duq L Rev 727
(1990).
25. 361 Pa 284, 65 A2d 150 (1949).
26. Ogontz, 65 A2d at 153.
27. Id at 152.
28. Id at 164.





tics existed, noting that profits in excess of operating expenses
were used to pay off other debts.
32
It is also interesting that in this 1949 case, the court mentioned
in closing, the ever growing tax burden placed on the American
citizens, implying the need for increased scrutiny of such so called
charitable organizations.3 This paragraph in the opinion proved to
be quite prophetic as the case law moved into the mid 1980's.
Significantly, in 1982 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld
the tax exempt status of West Allegheny Hospital in West Alle-
gheny Hospital v Board of Property Assessment.34 This was ap-
parently inconsistent with Ogontz as West Allegheny Hospital, like
the Ogontz School, covered the vast majority of its operating ex-
penses and cost of capital acquisition through fees collected from
patients.3 5 The court rationalized its decision, however, by inter-
preting 72 PS s 5020-204 (a) (3) to authorize such revenue to not
only "support" the institution but also "to increase the efficiency
of the facilities thereof, the repair and the necessary increase of
the grounds thereof. .. .
The dissent characterized the majority opinion as merely con-
cluding that because a hospital promotes health and is public that
it should be tax exempt.3 The dissenters further alleged that a
clear three point test had been synthesized by Pennsylvania case
law which was not utilized to determine tax exemption under 72
PS 5020-204(a)(3).35 This test, as set forth in the Wood School Tax
Exemption Case3 9 established that:
[t]o obtain the claimed exemption from taxation, (appellant) must affirma-
tively show that the entire institution, (1) is one of "purely public charity;"
(2) was founded by public or private charity; (3) is maintained by public or
private charity.'0
Although the dissenters conceded that its open admission policy,
along with its anti-discriminatory by-laws may satisfy the first
prong of the test, they opined that West Allegheny had failed to
32. Id at 164.
33. Id.
34. West Allegheny Hospital v Board of Property Assessment, 500 Pa 236, 455 A2d
1170 (1982).
35. West Allegheny, 455 A2d at 1172.
36. Id at 1172-73 citing 72 PS proviso to § 5020-204 (a) (3) (Purdon Supp 1982).
37. 455 A2d at 1173. Justice Nix filed the dissenting opinion which was joined by
Justice Hutchinson. Id.
38. Id. -
39. 406 Pa 579, 584, 178 A2d 600, 602 (1962).
40. Wood, 178 A2d at 602.
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satisfy the second and third prongs."
In reference to the second prong, the dissent revealed that the
original property was purchased in 1956 for a below market value
of $40,000.00 by Drs. Roberts and Grilli.22 The deed was placed in
the name of the Tioga Corporation, not known to be a non-profit
corporation, and subsequently sold to West Allegheny for
$590,000.00. 4 The incorporators of the non-profit West Allegheny
Hospital included, inter alia, Drs. Roberts and Grilli. 4 Based on
this record, the dissenters concluded that the institution had not
been founded by gift, either public or private, and thus it failed
the second prong of the test."
In addressing the failure of West Allegheny ,to meet the third
prong, the dissent related the fact that 97% of the amounts billed
for in-patient care and 80% of the amounts billed for out-patient
care were paid or caused to be paid by patients." Furthermore, the
dissent noted that the hospital retained a collection agency to re-
cover outstanding patient accounts. 7 The dissent also took excep-
tion to the majority's perception that this income constituted reve-
nue under the proviso to section 204 (a) (3); they reasoned this
merely masked the fact that operating costs were actually being
covered by patients, thereby violating the concept of a "purely
public charity.
' '4 8
When reading the opinion rendered in Ogontz together with that
in West Allegheny, it is difficult to deny that the main distinction
between the two cases is that Ogontz was an educational institu-
tion and West Allegheny was a healthcare institution.
In the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hospital
Utilization Project v Commonwealth, Justice Nix, a dissenter in
West Allegheny, brought the court one step closer to applying a
stricter construction of the constitutional and statutory provisions
relating to tax exemption in the healthcare setting.49 In this case, a
41. West Allegheny, 455 A2d at 1174. The dissent notes in footnote 1 that the pure





45. Id. Footnote 2 of the dissent reveals that although loans were made to West Alle-
gheny at the outset of the project that these loans were repaid with interest therefore not
qualifying as gifts. Id at n 2.
46. Id at 1174.
47. Id.
48. Id at 1175.
49. Hospitalization Utilization Project v Commonwealth, 507 Pa 1, 487 A2d 1306
Vol. 31:343
Comments
provider of statistical analysis of patient treatment sought tax ex-
emption from sales and use taxes.5
The company, Hospital Utilization Project ("HUP"), was formed
in 1963 by the Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania and was
funded primarily with charitable contributions from the Allegheny
County Medical Foundation as well as many other private and
public donations of like kind from 1963-1966."1 By 1967, HUP was
financially secure and the Hospital Council and Medical Societies
divested themselves from HUP.52 HUP was subsequently funded
by fees which were collected from hospitals which utilized their
services." Since HUP was associated with the Hospital Council
and Medical Societies at its inception, it was granted a sales tax
exemptions by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Sales and Use Tax in
1965. 51 In 1969, HUP was granted non-profit status under Pennsyl-
vania Law.55
In December 1980, the Board of Appeals of the Department of
Revenue revoked HUP's tax exempt status based on their finding
that it was neither a charitable organization nor engaged in manu-
facturing. 56 HUP promptly appealed to the Board of Finance and
Revenue and the Commonwealth Court57 who both affirmed the
decision of the Board of Appeals of the Department of Revenue
denying HUP tax exempt status.58
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied a new five
point test in determining whether HUP was a "purely public char-
ity" according to the Pennsylvania Constitution. In enunciating
the five elements of the so called HUP test, the court stated:
From the foregoing it can be concluded that an entity qualifies as a purely
public charity if it possesses the following characteristics:
(a) Advances a charitable purpose;
(b) Donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its
services;
(c) Benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legit-
(1985).
50. Hospital Utilization Project, 487 A2d at 1308-9.
51. Id at 1309.
52. Id.
53. Id.
.54. Id at 1310.
55. Id.
56. Id at 1308-09.
57. Id at 1309.
58. Id.
59. Id at 1317. See note 5 and accompanying text.
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imate subjects of charity;
(d) Relieves the government of some of its burden; and
(e) Operates entirely free from private profit motive."
As to the first prong, the court concluded that HUP failed as its
purpose of promoting the maintenance of high quality care and the
effective use of healthcare services did not meet the legal definition
of charitable. 1 The definition applied by the court was that enun-
ciated in Hill School Tax Exemption Case which stated:
The word "charitable," in a legal sense, includes every gift for a general
public use, to be applied, consistent with existing laws, for the benefit of an
indefinite number of persons, and designed to benefit them from an educa-
tional, religious, moral, physical or social standpoint. In its broadest mean-
ing it is understood 'to refer to something done or given for the benefit of
our fellows or the public.' 2
HUP failed the second prong because clients had to pay fees
consistent with actual costs in order to receive services, therefore,
these services were not donated or rendered gratuitously. 3 It was
also asserted that HUP did not possess the eleemosynary attrib-
utes affiliated with charitable organizations. 4
The court found the third prong was not satisfied because the
beneficiaries of HUP's services were a definitive number of hospi-
tals and health care institutions which, when classified as adminis-
trative entities, were not legitimate objects of charity. 5
In an attempt to meet the fourth element of the test, HUP ar-
gued that if it did not offer its service the government would have
to carry the burden of doing so."6 This argument was rejected by
the court, which noted that these services were not traditionally
done by the government and that HUP had presented no evidence
showing that the government would engage in such research.6
In reference to the fifth prong, it was stated that HUP was virtu-
ally indistinguishable from other commercial enterprises as it was
able to generate significant profits which were used to upgrade
their computer equipment and pay its officers and directors gener-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id, citing Hill School Tax Exemption Case, 370 Pa 21, 25, 87 A2d 259, 262
(1952).








After the decision in HUP, the guidelines for defining a charita-
ble institution under Pennsylvania law had finally been set. The
only question remaining was how this test would be applied to in-
stitutions whose primary purpose was,that of healthcare provider.
Three years after HUP, and seven years before Pennsylvania
would attempt to answer the question, the Supreme Court of Utah
took the lead by utilizing their own test in revoking the tax exempt
status of two non-profit hospitals in -Utah County v Intermountain
Health Care, Inc. .69
As in Pennsylvania, the Utah law of charitable tax exemptions is
founded in its Constitution.7" Utah also attempts to clarify the
Constitutional provisions by statute in the Utah Code Annotated.
71
Thus, the Utah Supreme Court in Intermountain Healthcare ap-
plied a six point test 72 for the charitable purpose exemption de-
rived from that which was set forth in section 59-2-30 of the Utah
Code,73 a provision strikingly similar to that which evolved through
Pennsylvania case law. Section 59-2-30 states:
[a]ny property whose use is dedicated to religious worship or charitable pur-
poses including property which is incidental to and reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of such religious worship or charitable purposes, in-
tended to benefit an indefinite number of persons is exempt from taxation if
all of the following requirements are met:
(1) The user is not organized to produce a profit from the use of the
property.
(2) No part of any net earnings, from the use of property, inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, but any net earn-
ings shall be used directly or indirectly, for the charitable or religious
68. Id at 1318.
69. 709 P2d 265 (Utah 1985).
70. Utah Const, Art XIII § 2. The relevant text provides:
The property of the state, cities, counties, towns, school districts, municipal corpora-
tions and public libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either
religious worship or charitable purposes, . . . shall be exempt from taxation.
Utah Const, Art XIII § 2 (emphasis added) compare to text of Pa Const, Art VIII § 2 in
note 5.
71. Utah Code Ann §§ 59-2-10 and 59-2-31 (The Michie Company 1974) (repealed in
1987).
72. Intermountain Healthcare, 709 P2d at 269-70.
73. Utah Code Ann § 59-2-30. Intermountain Healthcare reviewed the statutory pro-
visions of sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31 when it created its six point test for charitable pur-
pose exemptions. The reader should note that these statutes have since been repealed. The
Utah Supreme Court, however, did not follow the literal statutory language of these since-
repealed sections, but instead created its own six point test for determining whether a hos-
pital would qualify for a charitable exemption.
1993
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purposes of the organization.
(3) The property is not used or operated by the organization or other
person so as to benefit any officer, trustee, director, shareholder, les-
sor, member, employee, contributor or any other person through the
distribution of profits, payment of excessive charges or compensations.
(4) Upon liquidation, dissolution, or abandonment of the user no part
.of any proceeds derived from such use will inure to the benefit of any
private person. 4
Section 59-2-31 further provides:
(1) Property used exclusively for religious, hospital, educational, employee
representation, or welfare purposes which use complies with the require-
ments of 59-2-30, shall be deemed to be used for charitable purposes within
the exemption for in Section 2 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the
State of Utah.75
From the above sources, the Utah Supreme Court formulated
the following six point test:
(1) Whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide a significant ser-
vice to others without immediate expectation of material reward;
(2)' Whether the entity is supported, and to what extent, by donations
and gifts;
(3) Whether the recipients of the 'charity' are required to pay for the
assistance received, in whole or in part;
(4) Whether the income received from all sources (gifts, donations, and
payments from recipients) produces a 'profit' to the entity in the sense that
the income exceeds operating and long term maintenance expenses;
(5) Whether the beneficiaries of the 'charity' are restricted or unrestricted
and, if restricted, whether the restriction bears a reasonable relationship to
the entity's charitable objectives;
(6) Whether dividends or some other form of financial benefit, or assets
upon dissolution, are available to private interests, and whether the entity is
organized and operated so that any commercial activities are subordinate or
incidental to charitable ones."6
74. Id.
75. Utah Code Ann 59-2-31 (The Michie Company 1974) (repealed). The relevant
language of section 59-2-31 has been somewhat parallelled in Utah Code Ann section 59-2-
1101(2)(d) (The Michie Company 1987) which provides: "The following property is exempt
from taxation: . . . property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, or educational purposes." Utah Code Ann § 59-2-1101. The obvious change
in this new statute is the replacement of the words "hospital, employee or welfare pur-
poses", found in section 59-2-31, with the words "charitable purposes."
76. Intermountain Healthcare, 709 P2d at 269-70. The Intermountain Healthcare
test did not mirror the repealed statutory language of sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31. Rather,
the Utah Supreme Court created its own standards which were in fact more stringent than
the standards found in the legislative statutes. The recent codification of section 59-2-1101
does not legislatively overrule the Intermountain Healthcare test. Instead, it is arguable
that the legislature intended the this test to be used when determining whether a nonprofit
entity has used its property for "exclusively charitable purposes." Utah Code Ann § 59-2-
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In this case, the majority held that Intermountain Healthcare
("IHC") had not been clearly supported by gifts or donations.
7
7
For example, the court recognized third party payments, such as
those from Blue Cross and Medicare, merely as a reciprocal ex-
change of services for money. 8
In so determining, the Utah Court heavily scrutinized both the
amount of free care provided, which constituted less than 1% of
their gross revenues, and IHC's failure to advertise the availability
of free care.79 The court also concluded that since IHC had not
shown that without the tax exemption it would operate at a loss, it
was, as a non-profit organization, afforded an unfair competitive
advantage over for-profit entities."0 As this was evolving in Utah,
many local governments in other states had begun to seriously
challenge the tax exempt status of their larger hospitals."'
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania dealt an ominous
blow to the tax exempt status of non-profit hospitals in Pennsylva-
nia in The School District of the City of Erie and the City and
County of Erie v Hamot Medical Center of Erie (Hamot).82 In this
case, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the order of the Court of
Common Pleas which declared that Hamot was not entitled to re-
tain its tax exempt status for real property taxes.8 3
Hamot, founded in 1881 by public and private charities, pro-
vided healthcare to the Erie community as a non-profit corpora-
tion. 4 As many hospitals did during the 1980's, Hamot underwent
a corporate reorganization in 1981 which led to the formation of
Hamot Health Systems,Inc.,("HHSI"). s5 HHSI functioned to su-
pervise the operation of a multitude of other entities which in-
cluded: Hamot Medical Center; Hamot Corporate Services, Inc. (a
management and administrative service); Regional Health Ser-
vices, Inc. (a provider of ambulatory and related healthcare ser-
vices); Senior Living Services, Inc. (which offered senior citizen
care and services); the Center for Personal and Family Growth
1101.
77. Id at 273. This was a split decision.
78. Id at 274.
79. Id.
80. Id at 278.
81. At the time of (IHC), challenges were underway in Tennessee, Vermont, Pennsyl-
vania, inter alia. See Comment, 9 Va Tax Rev at 599 n 9 (1990) (cited in note 2).
82. 144 Pa Commw 668, 602 A2d 407 (1992).
83. Hamot, 602 A2d 407-8. Judge Doyle wrote the opinion for the unanimous court.




(which provided psychological and support services); Bayside
Pharmacy Services, Inc.; Independent Professional Services, Inc.,
(a diagnostic imaging center); Joint Patient Services, Inc. (an on-
cology treatment center); Community Rehabilitation Specialists (a
rehabilitative health service); Great Lakes Home Health (which in-
volved in the sales of durable medical equipment); Cardiac Fitness
(which provided healthcare for those with cardiac disorders); Col-
lege Park Properties (owner of real estate in Edinboro, PA); and
Great Lakes Manage Care (a health maintenance facility)., 6 Fur-
thermore, HHSI, through another entity, Bayside Development
Corporation, owned a substantial amount of real estate in the Erie
area which included condominiums and a marina" and partici-
pated in the leasing of office space to non-affiliated businesses."8
Also, through Hamot, HHSI oversaw a competitive answering ser-
vice and paging systems company and a competitive local health
club. 9
In its decision, the Commonwealth Court applied the five point
HUP test." At the outset, the court made it clear that the entity
seeking the exemption in such cases bears the burden of proof to
show that it satisfies each prong of the test.9
The court rejected Hamot's argument that it advanced a charita-
ble purpose.2 It held that Hamot's community education programs
were promotional in nature and designed to attract additional pay-
ing patients.9 3 Furthermore, the judges were not persuaded that
Hamot's urban renewal programs promoted a charitable purpose,
noting that these ventures were carried out primarily by subsidiar-
ies of HHSI, not Hamot per se.94 Therefore, Hamot failed to meet
the requirements of the first prong.95
Next, the court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Hamot
did not donate or render gratuitously a substantial portion of its





90. Id at 412. See notes 59-68 and accompanying text for a review of the 5 point HUP
test.
91. Id at 409. See also Hamot, 602 A2d at 414, n 7, citing G.D.L. Plaza, 132 Pa
Commw 134, 572 A2d 51 (1990).
92. Hamot, 602 A2d at 413-14.





surrounding the organization. 6 Various factors taken into account
in reaching this decision consisted of: revenues generated from
paying patients which were utilized to cover Hamot's losses;
Hamot's indigent treatment plan which was mandated by statute
and not undertaken voluntarily; and fees paid by Medicare and
Medicaid which qualified as reimbursement.9 7 The court also men-
tioned that Hamot had in fact initiated lawsuits against Medicare-
Medicaid for increased reimbursement levels.98 In addition, as in
the IHC case, the court noted a large profit margin since Hamot's
reorganization. 9 Thus, for the above reasons, the court concluded
that Hamot failed to fulfill the requirements of the second
prong.
100
Hamot was unsuccessful in meeting the third prong's criteria es-
sentially because the court found that Hamot operated under a
profit motive." 1 In the words of the trial court, "[Hamot] accepts
defeat only after collection and execution processes fail to yield
fruit."102 According to the court, Hamot qualifies its services as
charitable after the debt is determined to be uncollectible, rather
than targeting such services as charitable upon admittance.0 3
Quoting the trial court, the commonwealth court stated in part:
Hamot has sued the very patients that it would now have this court deem
objects of charity. These cases are numerous as evidenced by the School
District's Exhibit, which indicated the number of collection actions filed in
the Office of the Prothonotary of Erie County. Hamot's collection agency
not only pursues collection of money but takes individual assets by
execution."0 4
Both the trial court and commonwealth court agreed, however,
that Hamot did meet the fourth prong of the test satisfactorily in
that it relieved the government of some of its burden. 0 5 However,
as noted infra, all of the prongs must be met for the entity seeking




99. Id. Since 1981, Hamot had operated with an overall $58 million profit. Id at 410-
11.




104. Id at 411-12.
105. Id at 414.
106. Id. See note 91.
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Hamot, according to the court, dismally failed the fifth prong of
the test.107 Failure was predicated upon the fact that Hamot, since
its reorganization in 1981, had showed a large profit margin.108
Moreover, the salaries paid to executives of Hamot were described
by the court as being "copious."109 Haying failed to carry its bur-
den of showing satisfaction of four of the five prongs, Hamot's tax
exempt status was revoked. 110
Approximately. one month after the commonwealth court of
Pennsylvania handed down its decision in Hamot, the common-
wealth court reversed a decision of the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County, rejecting the application by a nursing home for
an exemption from real property taxes in St. Margaret Seneca
Place v Municipality of Penn Hills and the Penn Hills School
District of Allegheny County.' The commonwealth court utilized
the five part HUP test in determining whether the nursing home
deserved tax exempt status."2
As to the first and second prongs of the test, the commonwealth
court held that although care for the elderly is a charitable purpose
and although the elderly are legitimate objects of charity, in this
case, the residents of the nursing home were required to pay for its
services." 3 The court also cited testimony of an executive vice
president of the hospital who, when asked if a non-paying resident
would ever be admitted over a paying resident, responded:
We would really be forced I would think to take..we don't have a hard and
fast rule to answer that question, but we would be prudent to take the per-
son who could afford to pay for the care."'
The court thus concluded that the hospital failed to make a bona
fide effort to provide service to those who cannot afford its usual
fees.
1 5
107. Hamot, 602 A2d at 414.
108. Id. See note 99.
109. Id at 411. The court noted that Hamot executives salaries plus retirement benefit
packages were worth $250,000 - $300,000 per year. Furthermore, additional perks such as
payment of membership dues to the Erie Yacht Club were offered to corporate executives.
Id.
110. Id at 414.
111. Pa Commw , 604 A2d 1119 (1992).
112. St. Margaret Seneca Place, 604 A2d at 1122-23.
113. Id at 1123-25. Virtually all of the residents pay for the services rendered via in-
surance or private payment. A breakdown of a sampling of the nursing home's patients
revealed that 48.5% were covered by medicaid, 10.7% by Medicare, 10.2% by Blue Cross
and 30.6% paid privately. Id at 1122:
114. Id citing Notes of Testimony at 185a.
115. Id at 1125.
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Although the court conceded that the elderly per se are legiti-
mate objects of charity, the court nevertheless held that in order to
satisfy the third prong, the class must be indefinite.116 Based on
the testimony of-the executive vice president, the court concluded
that the class, being comprised of only those elderly who could
pay, was not indefinite. 1 7 Consequently, the hospital failed to
meet the requirements of the third prong. 1
8
As to the fourth prong, in contrast to Hamot, the commonwealth
court in St. Margaret's applied a broader standard in finding that
since 59.2% of its revenues were generated from government subsi-
dized programs, the hospital did not relieve the government of
some of its burden.1 '9
In addressing the fifth prong, the court rejected St. Margaret's
contention that they operated free from a private profit motive.
120
St. Margaret's claimed that their assertions were supported by the
fact that they had an open admissions policy which accepted
Medicare recipients whom the for-profit nursing homes would not
accept. 21 The court countered this argument by claiming that the
policy, in actuality, was not open as the home considered the pro-
spective resident's ability to pay in determining whether or not to
admit the patient.
1 22
The court made further reference to the nursing home's state-
ment of direction and purpose which provided:
The health system shall utilize the organizational structure that strives to
achieve optimal volumes of patient services and maintain a financially com-
petitive and viable position.'
2'
Furthermore, the court noted that the nursing home's operating
budget revealed that it expected to make a profit of $199,100 for
the 1991 tax year.'2 4 Consequently, as.St. Margaret's Seneca Valley
Nursing Home failed to meet any of the criteria under Pennsylva-
nia law warranting a charitable tax exemption, its application for
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Given the HUP criteria and the recently refined application of
this test by the common pleas and commonwealth courts of Penn-
sylvania, avoiding the tax problem will be difficult. Based on the
stern language and strict scrutiny applied by these courts, a direct
judicial challenge by the hospital will prove costly and probably.
yield little gain.
For example, Hamot Medical Center has already spent approxi-
mately $586,000.00 in attorneys' fees and has yet to prevail in any
court thus far.126 In the meantime, they are now liable for a total of
4 million dollars in taxes to the City of Erie, the Erie School Dis-
trict and Erie County.
127
If Pennsylvania Courts continue to follow the trend evidenced
by their decisions in Hamot and St. Margaret's, it is certainly pos-
sible that very few, if any, hospitals could survive like challenges
by local taxing authorities. Noting the tremendous cost in litigat-
ing these issues, described supra, and the blow such litigation can
deal to a hospital's image, the healthcare attorney must at least
consider alternative methods of maintaining tax exempt status.
Most local taxing authorities, prior to entering a formal chal-
lenge to the hospitals' tax exempt status, have sought to procure
an annual payment in lieu of taxes.12 Despite a challenge as to' the
legality of these settlements by the Hospital Council of Western
Pennsylvania ,in the United States District Court of Pennsylvania,
many institutions in Allegheny County have entered into such
agreements. '29 It appears that at least in Western Pennsylvania,
the taxing authorities are amenable to entering into these agree-
ments and also prefer this method over litigation.
Hospitals may also make an attempt to reorganize their corpo-
rate structure so as to conform to the better defined HUP criteria.
This method would encompass the divestment of hospitals from
their non-medical profit making activities. This would certainly re-
duce profit margins which seemed to be a key area of scrutiny by
the courts.
126. The Erie Daily Times, 1 (January 15, 1992).
127. Id.
128. Allegheny General Hospital and Presbyterian University Hospital of Pittsburgh,
inter alia, have reached payment agreements with the City of Pittsburgh and Allegheny
County in lieu of taxes. Although the exact details of these settlements are confidential,
their existence has been confirmed by the Allegheny County Law Office and the Allegheny
General Hospital Legal Department.
129. See Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania v City of Pittsburgh, County of
Allegheny, City of Erie and City of Johnstown, Civil Action No 90-621 (Memorandum
Opinion of December 19, 1990).
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Hospitals must also be quite circumspect as to the status of their
indigent care services. Since the commonwealth court found the
aggressive collection techniques of Hamot extremely distasteful,
hospital billing and collection activities must be closely monitored
by hospital administration so as to avoid the harsh perception the
court had of such practices in Hamot.
Another alternative, recently chosen by a Pittsburgh area hospi-
tal, is to simply transform into a for-profit entity.130 This allows
the institution great latitude in organizing its corporate structure;
however, the feasibility of this method has yet to be shown.
In summary, healthcare institutions have been caught in a catch
twenty-two regarding non-profit status and charitable tax exemp-
tions. As they were primarily supported by public and private do-
nations through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the tech-
nological advancements of this century, coupled with the public's
demand to have access to this technology, has forced hospitals to
reorganize to subsidize these costs. Most of this reorganization was
done in the late 1970's and early 1980's."'
Unfortunately, once hospitals were able to sustain themselves by
revenues generated internally, the socio-economic climate began to
change around them. Local governments experienced a shrinking
tax base partially as a result of unemployment. Adding to the
problem, or possibly as a result of it, was the necessity of providing
access to healthcare for an expanding number of indigent patients.
Although tradition was temporarily enough to shelter hospitals
from taxation, this era has come to an end after such decisions as
Intermountain Healthcare.'32
With regards to which avenue hospitals should pursue, it ap-
pears that the courts have set a course consistent with extracting
local tax revenues from hospitals. Judicial challenges will prove
costly and yield little fruit. Corporate reorganization, in order to
meet certain criteria described by the courts would be logistically
difficult, time consuming and by their design significantly decrease
and/or eliminate any profit margin; perhaps to the point where the
institution may be forced to cease operations. The feasibility of the
non-profit to profit transition has yet to be proven and could obvi-
130. Braddock Hospital, outside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania has recently commenced
operations as a for profit entity. This is the only institution of its kind in Pennsylvania to
date.
131. See Horowitz, 13 American Journal of Law and Medicine at 527-59 (1982) (cited
in note 14).
132. 709 P2d 269 (Utah 1985).
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ously lead to massive tax liabilities as tax laws are changed by na-
ture in what some may argue as an arbitrary and capricious
fashion.
Perhaps the most pragmatic approach at this point would be for
hospitals to maintain an open line of communication with local
taxing bodies and reach an equitable agreement for in lieu pay-
ments. Although the ability of taxing authorities to enter into such
negotiations while threatening challenges to an institution's tax
status has come under constitutional attacks from certain hospital
organizations, 133 both the hospitals and taxing authorities have os-
tensibly deemed this method satisfactory. By agreeing to set in lieu
payments for a definite period of time, preferably as long as possi-
ble, hospitals may avoid unforeseen tax liabilities and easily
budget for the payments. This approach may afford hospitals the
most protection from this unstable situation which, in general,
seems to reflect the uncertainty of the future of healthcare across
the United States.
G. J. Simon, Jr.
133. See note 128 and accompanying text.
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